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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2486 
___________ 
 
RONALD BASS, SR., 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND  
FAMILIES; THE DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY; 
LAURA DAVIS, Head Supervisor of DYFS; ANNDRIA CALWELL,  
Supervisor, Family Specialist II; LASHONDA DRAKE, Case Worker, Family Services 
Specialist II; JOHN and/or Jane Doe 1-20, fictitiously named and as yet unidentified 
agents, servants and/or employees of the STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THEN KNOWN 
AS THE DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES “the defendants”, in 
addition to DCF and CP&P; ERIC KIRSCHNER, Forensic Psychologist; 
GWENDOLYN O. AUSTIN; DONALD O. EGBUCHULAM; CHILDREN AID 
FAMILY SERVICES, ET AL.; ERIC MEEHAN, DAG, for the State of New Jersey 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-14-cv-05006) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2016 
Before:  JORDAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 13, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Ronald Bass, Sr., appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We will affirm in part, vacate 
in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
  This lawsuit is related to a New Jersey state-court proceeding that resulted in the 
termination of Bass’s parental rights regarding his son, who was referred to in the state-
court action as N.R.B.  The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court 
affirmed that ruling, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.  See N.J. 
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.B., No. FG-07-92-11, 2014 WL 775314 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 28, 2014), certification denied, 94 A.3d 910 (N.J. 2014).  It 
does not appear that Bass filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 Instead, and approximately two months after the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
ruling, Bass filed pro se the federal complaint at issue here.  (He amended his complaint 
three days later to correct typographical errors but has not amended it substantively.)  
Bass named as defendants the State of New Jersey and certain of its agencies and 
employees (collectively, the “State Defendants”), a psychologist who testified during the 
parental-rights hearing, the lawyer who represented Bass during that hearing, and another 
lawyer apparently involved in that hearing.  The identities and roles of some of the 
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defendants are not immediately apparent from Bass’s amended complaint.  His amended 
complaint also is otherwise difficult to follow, and he did not set forth any discrete causes 
of action.   
 As a general matter, however, Bass’s claims appear to be of two kinds.  First, Bass 
alleged that the state-court proceeding was wrongly decided for a number of reasons.  He 
further alleged that the state-court ruling has injured him by depriving him of his parental 
rights and the ability to obtain state and federal benefits for his son.  Second, Bass alleged 
that various defendants committed misconduct before and during his termination 
proceeding, including by submitting fraudulent and misleading evidence, and that all 
defendants conspired to deprive him of his parental rights.  For relief, Bass requested 
monetary damages and “companionship with my son.” 
 The State Defendants and one other defendant filed motions to dismiss the 
amended complaint.  Both argued that Bass failed to state a claim, and the State 
Defendants also argued that his amended complaint is barred in part by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  The defendant psychologist, Eric Kirschner, answered 
the amended complaint and asserted cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against 
the other defendants.  The lawyer defendants, Gwendolyn Austin and Donald 
Egbuchalam, did not respond to Bass’s amended complaint.  On Bass’s motion, the 
District Court Clerk entered default against them, and Bass then filed a motion for the 
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entry of a default judgment.  He also previously filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction. 
 While these motions were pending, the District Court entered an order dismissing 
Bass’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District Court characterized 
its order as addressing the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte, and it concluded that it lacks 
federal question jurisdiction both because Bass did not state any claim arising under 
federal law and because his amended complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.  Bass appeals.1 
II. 
 We agree that Bass’s amended complaint is barred in large part by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.2  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow one that deprives District 
Courts of subject matter jurisdiction only when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state 
court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by the [the] state-court’s 
                                              
1 The District Court did not specifically dispose of Kirchner’s cross-claims, but it 
effectively did so by dismissing the action in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.  Cf. 
Owens. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that 
mere grant of summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s claim did not resolve that 
defendant’s crossclaim against another defendant).  Thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise de novo review over questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 
2 The District Court did not give Bass notice and an opportunity to respond before 
entering what it referred to as its sua sponte order to this effect, but the State Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss put Bass on notice of the Rooker-Feldman issue, Bass had the 
opportunity to respond, and he has addressed this issue on appeal. 
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judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 
 All of these requirements are satisfied to the extent that Bass complains of the loss 
of his parental rights and his ability to seek benefits for his son.  Bass lost his parental 
rights in state court before filing his federal suit, and his alleged injuries in this regard 
flow from the state-court judgment.  See id. at 166-67.  Awarding relief in this regard 
also would require the District Court to invalidate the state-court’s judgment.3 
 These requirements, however, are not satisfied to the extent that Bass raises 
independent claims regarding defendants’ alleged misconduct preceding and allegedly 
resulting in the state-court judgment.  See B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 260 
(3d Cir. 2013); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 171-73.  Although his 
allegations in this regard are not models of clarity, Bass’s amended complaint can be 
liberally construed to allege, inter alia, that defendants conspired to deprive him of due 
process by submitting fraudulent or misleading evidence.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
                                              
3 Bass’s brief on appeal leaves no doubt on this point.  Bass states that he is “appealing” 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial of certification and that “only the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, can reverse [the applicable] New Jersey Supreme Court Docket 
Numbers.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 2.)  Bass also argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
permits this Court to “reverse or modify a state-court judgment.”  (Id. at 6.)  Bass is 
incorrect because the only way to seek appellate review of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s decision was to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court.  See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291-92; 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
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does not bar those claims.  See B.S., 704 F.3d at 260; Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 
615 F.3d at 171-73. 
 Neither does the other jurisdictional ground on which the District Court relied.  
The District Court concluded that it lacked federal question jurisdiction because, although 
Bass cited various federal laws, he did not actually state a claim arising under any of 
those federal laws.  But among the federal laws Bass cited were several constitutional 
provisions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits the assertion of constitutional claims 
against certain state actors.  In the absence of a determination that Bass’s claims in this 
regard were “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” which the District Court did not make, 
“the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for 
a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”  Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455-56 
(2015) (quotation marks omitted).  And plaintiffs who fail to state a proper cause of 
action generally must be given leave to amend before a dismissal on the merits.  See 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 Thus, whether Bass’s amended complaint actually states a federal claim calls for a 
determination on the merits and consideration of leave to amend.  The District Court did 
not expressly attempt to identify Bass’s claims or explain why they failed to state a claim 
on the merits.  We acknowledge that Bass’s claims in this regard are largely conclusory 
and may suffer from other defects as well.  Given the importance of the rights potentially 
at issue and Bass’s pro se status, however, we believe that further consideration is 
warranted.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s order of dismissal to the extent that 
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it dismissed Bass’s claims regarding defendants’ alleged conduct occurring before the 
termination of his parental rights, and we will remand for the District Court to consider 
those claims and the possibility of amendment in the first instance.   
 We reiterate that we are affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the amended 
complaint to the extent that Bass seeks relief from the termination of his parental rights 
and his inability to seek state and federal benefits for his son.  Bass is advised that the 
District Court, as part of this proceeding, cannot restore his parental rights or award him 
damages based solely on the loss of those rights. 
III. 
  For these reasons, we will affirm in part and vacate in part the judgment of the 
District Court and will remand for further proceedings.  Bass’s requests for relief in his 
briefs are otherwise denied.4 
 
                                              
4 Bass requests that we remand this matter to a District Court location other than Newark, 
New Jersey.  Bass has not shown any basis for the reassignment on remand, and we 
perceive none.  Bass also requests appointment of counsel on appeal.  Bass did not file an 
actual motion for counsel, and appointment of counsel on appeal is not warranted.  Bass 
did file a motion for counsel in the District Court, and a Magistrate Judge denied it.  Bass 
states in his brief that he is appealing that ruling, but he did not seek reconsideration of 
that ruling by the District Court, did not mention it in his notice of appeal, and has not 
raised any actual argument regarding counsel in his briefs.  Nevertheless, we perceive no 
abuse of discretion in the denial of Bass’s motion for counsel at this stage of the 
litigation.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993). 
